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STATE ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT
AND STATE REGULATED INDUSTRIES
BIL L. BRYANT,

JR.*

AND
icIHARD BELLAK**
INTRODUCTION

An important impetus to the deregulation of the trucking industry, and the
current trend toward deregulation generally, is the perception that a byproduct
of government regulation is wasteful anticompetitive activity. When deregulation occurs, state and federal antitrust laws can be fully inforced against anticompetitive practices within an industry. But in the absence of deregulation or
in the case of partial deregulation, the extent to which state and federal antitrust provisions limit anticompetitive activity by state regulated industries is
uncertain. Historically anticompetitive activity by state regulated industries
has not been effectively controlled by either state or federal antitrust law. Federal antitrust enforcement of state regulated industries has been limited by the
state action exemption. State antitrust enforcement has been hindered by inadequate resources and overreliance on federal enforcement.
State antitrust laws, however, can be effectively utilized to compliment the
deregulation trend by providing more efficient maintenance of competition in
those areas of the economy which remain subject to state regulation. After considering the need for state antitrust enforcement, this article will examine the
federal regulated industries doctrinal framework as a potential model for applying state antitrust law to state regulated industries and will compare it with
the approaches currently adopted by state courts. The article will demonstrate
that the legitimate goals of both regulation and antitrust enforcement can be
productively reconciled if the federal regulated industries analytical model is
adopted by state courts in applying state antitrust laws to state regulated industry.
THE NEED FOR STATE ANTITUST ENFORCEMENT
WITH REGARD TO STATE REGULATED INDUSTRIES

The relationship between state antitrust enforcement and regulated industries raises timely and complicated issues. First, the growth of state antitrust
activity is itself a recent phenomenon and, therefore, its many prospective
manifestations are of interest." Second, government regulation of economic ac*B.A., Florida State University, 1969; J.D., Florida State University, 1974. Chief, Antitrust
Section, Department of Legal Affairs, State of Florida; Assistant Attorney General, State of
Florida. Member Florida and American Bars.
**BA., University of Pennsylvania, 1966; M.F.A., Princeton, 1968; Ph.D., University of
Pennsylvania, 1976. Legal Research Assistant, Antitrust Section, Department of Legal Affairs,
State of Florida.
1. Fellmeth & Papageorge, A Treatise on State Antitrust Law and Enforcement With
Models and Forms,ANTrrRusr & TaAuE REG. REP. (BNA), Dec. 7, 1978, pp. 6-7.
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tivity has reached a paradoxical stage where there is general agreement that the
complexity of modern society will require regulation but, at the same time,
increasing worry over the harmful side effects of careless and unnecessary overregulation. 2 Since these two entities, state antitrust and government regulation,
are both objects of current interest, their intersection has predictably led to
speculation in the commentaries:3
There would appear to be substantial reasons for allocating a significant portion of a state antitrust program to review of state and local
economic regulation by occupational licensing laws, advertising and
other restrictions upon ongoing business activities, the granting or denial
of public franchises, state preference laws in public purchasing, public
utility regulation, the proprietary activities of state and local government
agencies, the delegation of public power to private groups to regulate
group or industry behavior, and the bewildering array of other state
intrusions into economic affairs in general or the activities of particular
lines of business.
Indeed, this commentary proceeds to list four reasons for state antitrust
4
scrutiny of state economic regulation:
1) Less than satisfactory efforts by the federal courts to examine state regulation;
2) Domination of state regulatory agencies by members of the industries
regulated, causing limitations on business entry and excessive licensing requirements;
3) State regulatory interference with competition resulting in higher
prices;
4) Immunity of certain anticompetitive state practices from federal antitrust prosecution because of the "state action" principle.
Of course, the recent narrowing of the scope of the state action doctrine5 in the
federal courts has been widely noted. 6 Although examination of this exemption
is outside the scope of this discussion, a brief consideration of its functions
provides a convenient point of departure for exposition of the federal regulated
industries doctrinal framework as an analytical model for applying state antitrust law to state regulated industries.
A PROPOSED ANALYTICAL MODEL FOR THE APPLICATION OF
STATE ANTITRUST LAW TO STATE REGULATED INDUSTRIES

If a state regulatory scheme mandates cooperative activity among private
producers of a certain commodity, and that activity is challenged under the
2. Flynn, Trends in Federal Antitrust Doctrine Suggesting Future Directions For State
Antitrust Enforcement, 4 J. CORP. LAw 479, 508 (1979).
3. Id. at 503.
4. Id. at 503-06.
5. See, e.g., Almeda Mall, Inc. v. Houston Lighting & Power Co., 615 F.2d 343 (5th Cir.
1980) (state action defense found inapplicable to practices of power company regulated by
municipality).
6. Note, The State Action Doctrine and State Antitrust Laws - Thirty Five Years of
Struggle, 30 MERCER L. REv. 1039, 1040 (1979).
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federal antitrust statutes, the court may hold that the state action doctrine
exempts the activity from antitrust scrutiny. The doctrine embodies a variety
of concerns related to considerations of federalism. Authorities differ, however,
as to whether it should be properly labeled an exemption from federal antitrust enforcement or a manifestation of the lack of federal intent to preempt
state economic regulation.7 The most common phraseology attending application of the doctrine is that sovereign acts of states were not meant to be included in the kinds of activities proscribed by the federal antitrust laws.8
But as state and local regulation has become more pervasive and complex,
and more kinds of private economic activity thus regulated have sought exclusion from federal antitrust scrutiny under the umbrella of the state action
rationale, federal courts have responded by narrowing the circumstances under
which the doctrine would be found applicable. Where this narrowing evolution
will lead is presently unclear; however, it is apparent that federalism concerns
will probably limit the narrowing process and, therefore, the precision and
efficacy with which federal courts can review the complex antitrust questions
posed by state regulation. In effect, the state action exemption, however narrow,
will remain too broad. 9
Suppose, however, that the regulatory scheme in the hypothetical just posed
was the product of a federal, rather than a state, agency, and the cooperative
activity was interstate in nature. The state action doctrine would obviously not
apply because of the absence of federalism concerns. Nevertheless, difficult problems remain in determining the extent to which regulation immunizes anticompetitive actions from antitrust attack and in deciding who should consider
the factual and legal questions involved. Indeed, the problems raised in the
intersection of regulation and antitrust are among the most difficult issues in
antitrust law. A large body of federal case law, however, has produced an
analytical framework for the application of federal antitrust law to federal
regulated industries. This federal framework, suggested here as an analytical
model for the application of state antitrust law to state regulated industries,
consists of four related doctrines.
Several of these doctrines relate to the initial question of whether the regulatory scheme immunizes or exempts anticompetitive activity from antitrust
challenge. Because the question of exemption is one of legislative intent, the
issue of immunity is more easily resolved where Congress has expressly addressed
the problem. The express agency jurisdiction doctrine applies where there is
an express exemption from the antitrust laws in the statute empowering the
regulatory authority.0 If an express exemption is present, it serves as a complete
defense to the antitrust claim.11 The exclusive judicial jurisdiction doctrine
applies where there is an express statutory provision preserving antitrust en7. 7 J. VON
8. Id.

KALiNOWSEI, ANTrrRusr LAws Am TRADE REGULATION §46.05[l]

(1969).

9. Flynn, supra note 2, at 501.
10. It should be noted that under the federal analysis statutory exemptions are strictly
construed and therefore the challenged activity must be expressly covered by the statutory exemption. See Mt. Hood Stages, Inc. v. Greyhound Corp., 555 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1977).
11. See, e.g., Hughes Tool Co. v. Transworld Airlines, Inc., 409 U.S. 363 (1973).
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forcement. Under this doctrine there is full antitrust enforcement even if the
challenged conduct has been approved by a regulatory agency.
The question of exemption is more difficult where there is no explicit statutory indication of legislative intent as to whether antitrust law should apply to
federally regulated industries. The doctrine of exclusive agency jurisdiction has
been developed to determine whether an exemption should be implied from
the regulatory scheme.12 In applying the exclusive agency jurisdiction doctrine,
federal courts are reluctant to find an exemption except where necessary to
allow the regulatory agency to function."3 The courts determine the purposes
and goals set forth by the regulatory scheme and then ascertain if the acts
complained of are necessary to the furtherance of those purposes and goals.
If a court determines that there is no antitrust exemption based on the
foregoing doctrines, or it is unclear whether the exclusive agency jurisdiction is
present, the further question arises as to whether the doctrine of primary jurisdiction or "prior resort" is applicable. Under this doctrine, federal courts require "prior resort" to the appropriate agency for determination of facts within
that agency's paticular competence.1 4 An example of the application of the
primary jurisdiction doctrine is Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exchange.-8 In
Ricci, the plaintiff alleged that he was deprived of his membership on the
Chicago Merchantile Exchange in violation of the Exchange's rules. The United
States Supreme Court affirmed the seventh circuit's stay of antitrust action
pending a determination by the Commodity Exchange Commission of whether
its rules were in fact violated. The Supreme Court explained that such a determination would materially aid in deciding the ultimate issue of whether the
Commodity Exchange Act exempted the Exchange's actions under the exclusive
agency jurisdiction doctrine. The court stated that "[ilf the transfer of Ricci's
membership was pursuant to a valid rule, the immediate question for the antitrust court is whether the rule itself and Ricci's exclusion under it are insulated
from antitrust attack" whereas "if, as Ricci alleges, loss of his membership was
contrary to exchange rules, the antitrust action should very likely take its
normal course." 18
These four doctrines, which comprise the federal regulated industries analytical framework, provide a detailed approach to reconciling antitrust and
regulatory policies. In the absence of express legislative direction, the doctrine
of exclusive agency jurisdiction avoids undue deference to regulatory agencies
by implying exemptions only where they are found necessary to allow the
regulatory scheme to function. Additionally, the doctrine of primary jurisdic12. See, e.g., Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
13. Recently, the Supreme Court appears to have retreated somewhat from the strict
principle that repeal of the antitrust laws will be implied only if necessary to make the statute
in question work and then only to the minimum extent necessary. See Gordon v. New York
Stock Exchange, Inc., 422 U.S. 659 (1975); United States v. National Ass'n of Securities Dealers,

422 U.S. 694 (1975).
14. The distinction between claims for exemption and the doctrine of primary jurisdiction
is explained in United States v. National Broadcasting Co., [1974-1] TRADE CASES (CCH) 274,885
(C.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 1973).
15. 409 U.S. 289 (1973).
16. Id. at 303.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol32/iss5/7

4

Bryant and Bellak: State Antitrust Enforcement and State Regulated Industries
1980]

STATE REGULATED INDUSTRIES

tion further accomplishes a finetuned accommodation between antitrust policy
and regulatory policy by recognizing the particular competence of agencies as
to some questions of law and fact while reserving to the courts ultimate jurisdiction over the action.
Though the state action doctrine involves federalism issues absent in the
federal regulated industries analysis just articulated, it is clear that the underlying principles are analogous. The Seventh Circuit, in City of Mishawaka v.
Indiana & Michigan Electric Co.,17 drew the analogy between state action and
exclusive agency jurisdiction:
First... as with state action, it may be unfair to hold the defendant accountable for actions ordered by a s sovereign, in this case the FPC. Second, it may have been the intention of Congress to exempt from the
antitrust laws businesses subject to a potentially conflicting regulatory
scheme.' 8

The evolution of the federal regulated industries doctrines has been, as well,
analogous to that of state action. 9 Commentators, for example, were quick to
warn that anything more than sparing invocation of the exclusive agency jurisdiction exemption and the primary jurisdiction doctrine would constitute a
kind of judicial abdication on the part of the antitrust courts.20 And, again, as
the accretion of complex layers of federal regulation continued and additional
private economic activity thus regulated sought exclusion from antitrust challenge under the procedural umbrella of exclusive agency jurisdiction and primary jurisdiction, the courts responded by finding only reluctantly that regulatory legislation had implied a repeal of the antitrust statutes, and then only
to the extent necessary for the existence of the regulatory scheme, thus narrowing the applicability of the doctrine.
What has evolved is an efficient system for subjecting federally regulated
activity to federal antitrust scrutiny. Unlike the state action doctrine, where
federalism concerns mean that even a narrow state action exemption will always be too broad to allow precise and effective federal antitrust scrutiny of
state regulation, the federal regulated industries analysis can be precisely
tailored so that any anticompetitive activity not necessitated by federal regulation will fall before the federal antitrust statutes.
The increasing vitality of state antitrust activity now raises the possibility of
replacing the ineffective federal antitrust scrutiny of state regulated activity
with an effective state antitrust enforcement mechanism based on the abovedescribed federal regulated industries analytical model.21 The likely and im17. 560 F.2d 1314 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 922 (1978).
18. 560 F.2d at 1819.
19. See City of Mishawaka v. American Elec. Power Co., 616 F.2d 976 (7th Cir. 1980), for
similar narrowing of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine. The court stated that the first amendment right to petition the government does not immunize abuse of the regulatory process

from the antitrust laws.
20. See Schwartz, Legal Restriction of Competition in the Regulated Industries: An
Abdication of JudicialResponsibility, 67 HARv. L. REv. 486 (1954).
21. For an exhaustive treatment of the federal cases see I P. ARaEMA & D. TURR, AmnTRusr LAw 112f221-29 (1978); 7 J. VON KAINOWSKI, supra note 7, at ch. 44A.
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portant result will be that some activity now exempt from federal antitrust law
under the state action exemption will be illegal under state antitrust law:
Activity clearly or arguably within the state action exemption from
federal antitrust, by virtue of its being compelled by a state agency acting
within its "sovereign" capacity of a political subdivision exercising sovereign powers, may still be found to conflict wth state antitrust policy.
Absent the concerns of federalism and vestigial federal court fears of a
rebirth of substantive due process, many state and local regulatory activities could be analyzed by state enforcement officials and state courts
in terms of primary jurisdiction notions much like the process developed
at the federal level. Thus, even where federal courts may find state action
immunity for federal antitrust purposes, the same activity viewed from
a state antitrust perspective may not be immune from state antitrust
policy absent a showing of a legislative intention to vest primary jurisdiction in a state or local regulatory authority, and then only to the extent
necessary to achieve the regulatory goal. By developing and applying a
primary jurisdiction jurisprudence at the state level in state courts, state
antitrust policy may fill an important role in confining and limiting state
and local regulation beyond that presently available under the federal
antitrust laws because of the broader and different
meaning for the state
22
action exemption from federal antitrust policy.
State antitrust enforcement of state-regulated industry should, therefore, utilize
the federal regulated industries analytical model. This approach obviates any
real repugnancy between regulatory and antitrust regimes, while allowing for
unimpaired control by the latter of unnecessary anticompetitive activity. There
are, however, problems attending state court adoption of this analytical model.
If, for example, federal antitrust litigation could be characterized as oceanlike in its vast extent, state antitrust litigation in comparison, especially with
regard to regulated industries, has been a mere trickle. Furthermore, the state
cases often fail to recognize or explicitly articulate the federal doctrines. Even
where a state statute invokes federal precedent as with the new Florida Antitrust Act, 23 it might be difficult to bridge the gap between the matured par-

ticularity of the federal cases and the relative lack of precedent in the state
cases. For example, we may determine from recent litigation the current status
of exclusive agency jurisdiction or primary jurisdiction with regard to Federal
Communications Commission regulated activities, but is that status realistically
applicable to dissimilar state agencies, or even a similar state agency with its
own unique legislative mandate? And how does one feed the accumulated subtleties of the various federal cases into a total state precedent of two cases?
With these caveats in mind, we proceed to balance the discussion of what
logically and probably should happen respecting state antitrust enforcement in
state regulated industries with a brief survey of what in fact has happened.
STATE COURT ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST CLAIms
AGAINST STATE REGULATED INDUSTRIES

State court decisions concerning state antitrust enforcement in state regu22.
23.

Flynn, supra note 2, at 506.
FLA. STAT. §542.27(2) (1980).
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lated industries reflect a variety of interpretive and philosophical approaches.

Some state cases are not dissimilar in reasoning from the federal regulated industries analysis, although they do not adopt it explicitly. Other cases ignore
the need to balance competing regulatory and antitrust policies, foregoing adequate judicial analysis and giving excessive deference to regulatory agencies.
Where strong statutory or constitutional expressions of antitrust policy are
present, state courts closely examine regulatory action. Two 1964 Texas appellate cases illustrate courts upholding vigorous state antitrust enforcement
against regulated industries. In Woods Exploration & Producing Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America24 appellants charged that appellees had conspired to
eliminate them from competing in the production of gas from the Appling
field and to restrict production from their wells by filing false reports with the
regulatory agency, the Railroad Commission of Texas, in violation of the Texas
antitrust statutes. The appellate court disagreed with the trial court's finding
that "the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the matters in issue and controversy
herein is vested first in the Railroad Commission 6f Texas." In overturning the
exclusive agency jurisdiction finding of the trial court, the appellate opinion
used strikingly clear language:
We recognize.., that the Railroad Commission of Texas is an administrative body having broad powers and discretion .... However, the
Railroad Commission is not a court and does not have jurisdiction to
entertain ... a suit for damages brought under the antitrust laws of
Texas.... [T]his is not a suit to test the validity of an order of the Railof
road Commission.... Regardless of the outcome of
25 this suit the orders
the Railroad Commission will remain unaffected.
It is apparent that the appellate court overruled the trial court's finding of
exclusive agency jurisdiction because of the strong disclaimer clause in the
Railroad Commission statutes against any assumption that the Texas antitrust
statutes were nullified. The statute read:
It is especially provided that nothing herein shall in any manner affect,
alter, diminish, change or modify the anti-trust and/or monopoly statutes of this State, and ... that if any provision of this act shall be so
void rather than the anticonstrued... it is hereby declared null and
28
trust and/or monopoly statutes of this state.
Undoubtedly, such a statement is helpful to a court attempting to meet its
antitrust enforcement responsibilities. In terms of the federal analytical model,
the court found that exclusive judicial jurisdiction was mandated by the express statutory language where, as here, there was no repugnancy between antitrust and regulatory concerns.
In Gerst v. Cain2 7 the plaintiff obtained an order directing the Savings and
24. 882 S.W.2d 343 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964).
25. Id. at 346-47. The parties were also litigating in federal court under the Clayton Act
(15 U.S.C.A. §§15, 26). Id. at 847.
26. Id. at 346, n.3.
27. 379 S.W.2d 699 (rex. Civ. App. 1964).
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Loan Commissioner to grant them a charter to operate a savings and loan association in downtown Houston. The appellate court considered whether granting the charter would unduly injure any existing association in the area. After
finding that the commissioner had no substantial evidence on which to deny
granting the charter, and that entrance of the appellees' association would not
produce overzealous, unfair, or ruinous competition,28 the court cited the Texas
Constitution in support of the following assertion: "The court and every agency
of the state are duty bound to avoid the creation, establishment or protection
of monopolies which are contrary to the genius of a free government and which
29
should never be allowed.."
In effect, the court refused to trade its antitrust responsibilities for agency
expertise. The court implied that it retained explicit antitrust jurisdiction over
lapses in that regard by any regulatory agency in the state. Together, the Gerst
and Woods cases are excellent examples of strong state antitrust enforcement in
the regulatory context, characterized by a refusal to find exclusive jurisdiction
in the agencies when no conflict between regulatory and antitrust regimes is
apparent.
A number of state cases, although reasoned in a manner roughly similar to
the federal regulated industries doctrinal analysis, fail to utilize the precision
in analysis exhibited by the federal cases. In particular, state courts often fail
to limit the scope of express or implied exemptions, giving broader than necessary deference to regulatory agencies. An Illinois Supreme Court case, Local
777, Seafarers International Union v. Illinois Commerce Commission,30 considered the monopoly status of a bus and taxicab company whose application to
the Illinois Commerce Commission for a certificate allowing it to provide transportation between "gold coast" hotels and airports was challenged on state antitrust grounds. The court noted that the Illinois antitrust statute exempted
public utilities from its coverage to the extent their activities were subject to
the jurisdiction of the commission.3' In affirming dismissal of the charges, the
court stated that "strict supervision and regulation, particularly with respect to
rates charged and services provided, make an effective safeguard against the
evils of monopoly at which antitrust laws are traditionally directed."32 The
court further noted that regulated activity was exempt from antitrust action
regardless of the circumstances in which it occurred. The effect of the exemption
was to place exclusive jurisdiction over the challenged activity in the commission without, unfortunately, setting limits on the extent of the exemption.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court used colorful language to delineate the
antitrust/regulation issue in Reese v. Associated Hospital Service, Inc.,33 com28. The court relied on the current and projected population growth of Houston as a
basis for its decision. It did not restrict itself to consideration of past conditions and conditions at the time of application for the charter. Id. at 701-02.
29. Id. at 711.

30. 45 I1. 2d 527, 260 N.E.2d 225 (1970).
31. Local 777 asserted the defendants actions were not protected by the antitrust act exemption because the regulated bus and taxicab company were controlled by the same nonregulated corporation. Id. at 530, 260 N.E.2d at 227.
32. Id at 535. 260 N.E.2d at 229.
33. 173 N.W.2d 661 (Wis. 1970).
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monly known as the Wisconsin Blue Cross case. There, the three percent discount allowed Blue Cross on charges by hospitals was challenged by commercial
insurers as a restraint of trade violative of the state antitrust statute. Since Blue
Cross's right to contract with hospitals was authorized by state statute, 34 the
trial court concluded that even if the discount restrained trade, the statute
authorizing Blue Cross's right to so contract superseded any contrary policy
expressed in the antitrust statute. The Wisconsin Supreme Court characterized
this as "using a meat cleaver to carve out a broad area of near complete exemption from antitrust provisions where a scalpel can more effectively be used
to permit a hospital service corporation to do exactly what the legislature has
authorized, in fact required, it to do."-s The court went on to explain that so
long as Blue Cross operated within its statutory authority, any resulting restraint of trade must be non-violative of the antitrust statute under the rule of
reason.30 The problem is, of course, that this formulation conceivably results
in as broad an exemption as the trial court's, though worded differently.37 On
the other hand, there is more sensitivity in it accorded the maxim that repeal
of the antitrust statute is not to be implied lightly.38
The breakdown of an agreement to allocate territories led to the antitrust
challenge in Southwest Mississippi Electric Power Association v. Mississippi
Power & Light Co.39 Two years after the 1954 agreement, the Mississippi Public
Service Commission was granted exclusive jurisdiction over the intrastate business and property of public utilities. Though the original private agreement
was challenged as a restraint of trade, the court held it immune because merged
into and superseded by orders of the Mississippi Public Service Commission which acted within its statutory authority in approving it.40 No antitrust
boundary to this authority is apparent from this opinion.
34. Wis.

STAT.

§182.032 (1965) authorized the creation of nonprofit hospital service cor-

porations to enable low or limited income individuals to provide for their own medical care.
State financed services could then be reserved for those who were completely unable to pay
for hospital care. Prior to selling to subscribers, the nonprofit corporations were required to
contract with hospitals to provide medical care to subscribers.
35. 173 N.W.2d at 664.
36. Id. The legislature also granted tax-exempt status to nonprofit hospital service corporations. The court noted that although such status was not challenged in the instant action,
the legislature acted within its power. Even if tax-exempt status was later found to be a
restraint on trade, it would not be an unreasonable restraint. Id. at 664.
37. The legislature placed nonprofit insurance companies under the regulatory control
of the state insurance department. Wis. STAT. §200.26(7) (1965). The insurance commissioner
reviewed each company annually prior to renewing a certificate of authority. Wis. STAT.
§201.045(1) (1965). The Commissioner was also empowered to petition the court to enjoin
any practices considered unfair to competition. Wis. STAT. §207.09(2) (1965). The court noted
that if the insurance commissioner was derelict in preventing unfair competitive practices
the proper remedy was a writ to require his performance rather than an antitrust suit. 173
N.W.2d at 666.
38. 7 J. VON KALMNowsI, supra note 6, at §44A.02(2), n.27.
39. 199 So. 2d 826 (Miss. 1967).
40. The court further noted that the territorial allocation contract on its own was not
enforceable. The contract derived its validity from regulatory commission approval of its
terms.
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Other state cases adopt interpretive approaches less indicative of a reasoned
accommodation of antitrust and regulatory policies. For example, an Opinion
of Attorney General of Arizona41 judged an Arizona State Board of Accountancy rule forbidding competitive bidding for professional services nonviolative
of the state antitrust statute. According to the opinion, the Arizona antitrust
laws concern:
Private persons combining in such a manner as to restrain or prevent
competition. Actions by administrative agencies of the state are in no
way affected by the laws of Arizona pertaining to combinations in restraint of trade. It has been uniformly held by the courts that federal
antitrust laws are not
applicable to monopolies which are created and
42
controlled by a state.
The attorney general apparently applied a state action rationale, based on an
over-optimistic reading of federal precedent, to purport an exemption from
43
state antitrust enforcement for activity in the shadow of state regulation.
The leading Florida case in the state antitrust/regulation area, Peoples Gas
System, Inc. v. City Gas Co., 4 illustrates a state court judicial attitude of extreme deference to regulatory authority. In Peoples Gas, an agreement allocating territories as to the two public utility gas companies was approved by the
Florida Public Utilities Commission. When one of the parties later challenged
the agreement on antitrust grounds, the trial court held the agreement did
violate the state antitrust statute. The court of appeals reversed, however, and
the Florida supreme court affirmed the reversal. The Florida supreme court
observed:
We are aware that it has been reported that a majority of jurisdictions considering this question have held similar agreements violative of
antitrust statutes ....
However, we are of the opinion that the cases so
holding have emphasized unduly the universal desirability of competition and have not shown sufficient awareness of the implications of the
modern development of the regulated monopoly. We believe the more
enlightened view to be that set out above.Undoubtedly, during a period of rising expectations about regulation, recognition of its potential might be considered appropriate. However, one can
question the conclusion that the nurture of legitimate regulation must entail
the nullification of effective antitrust enforcement. Indeed, it would not be
rash to assert the possibility of a different result, were a case like Peoples Gas
to be heard today, especially in view of the anomoly that the Public Utilities

41.

[1966] TRADE CASES (CCH) 71,880 (July 25, 1966).
42. Id. at 83,089-90.
43. The current status of similar professional regulation is reflected in United States v.
Texas State Bd. of Pub. Accountancy, [1978-1] TRADE CASES (CCH) 62,039 (W.D. Tex. May
5, 1978), af'd as modified, 592 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1979).
44. 182 So. 2d 429 (Fla. 1965).
45. Id. at 435.
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Commission later asked the court to rescind its approval of the territorial allocation on the grounds that it lacked the power originally to approve it.46
In terms of the federal regulated industries model and the exclusive agency
jurisdiction doctrine discussed previously, it is insufficient for a court to conclude that in some instances regulation should replace competition or repeal
the presumption in its favor. Rather, the court must decide whether the challenged anticompetitive conduct is necessary for the functioning of the regulatory scheme. If not, it must fall before the antitrust statutes. If necessary, on
the other hand, it stands outside the jurisdiction of the antitrust court, but not
merely because of a limitless exemption from scrutiny for all conduct in the
47
shadow of state regulation.
CONCLUSION

The few state cases which thus far have considered the antitrust/regulation
interface encourage the hypothesis that the federal regulated industries analytical model can be utilized by state courts as state antitrust law develops generally. Because the state action doctrine is irrelevant, considerations of federalism and preemption will not complicate further the already considerable
complexity of the antitrust/regulation relationship. However, given the complexity of the area, easily discernable patterns of results are no more likely to
emerge at the state level than at the federal level. But even if the law unfolds
on a case-by-case basis, the principles underlying the choices made can become
relatively dear.
Thus, the court may:
1) try the challenged conduct under the antitrust laws where legislation
expressly mandates that the state antitrust laws apply
2) defer to the exclusive jurisdiction of an agency when legislative intent
mandates that procedure; or
3) defer, on primary jurisdiction grounds, to a regulatory agency while
retaining ultimate jurisdiction over anticompetitive activity unnecessary for the functioning of the regulatory scheme.
Additionally, since primary and exclusive jurisdiction exemptions are narrower than those of state action, activities not exempt under state action will
continue to be non-exempt. However, activities exempt from federal antitrust
law under state action may not be exempt from state antitrust law.
46.

See Peoples Gas Sys., Inc. v. Mason, 187 So. 2d

47.

Flynn, supra note 2, at 506.
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